Boards and management pursuing the conversion option have a fiduciary responsibility to be open, transparent and comprehensive in the disclosures and other voting safeguards built into the conversion process. In fact, all previous conversions have far exceeded the statutory requirements for disclosure, which mandate notice to members. The new NCUA rules go well beyond that by requiring proxy materials to include speculation, for example, on whether or not a credit union converting to a mutual savings bank might subsequently demutualize by selling stock to the public. As pointed out by the American Bankers Association, this requirement is completely inconsistent with the rules of other federal regulators such as the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) which has over 30 years of experience with mutual-to-stock conversions.
This change also conflicts with an amendment to the 1998 legislation which specifically limited the role of the NCUA in a proposed charter conversion to receiving notification of intent to convert and verifying the voting process. No authority was given to review and regulate the specific content of the conversion material, which is precisely the objective of all new NCUA regulations since early 2004.
The Committee Report on the 1998 legislation also stated that the NCUA’s rules for charter conversions are to be “no more or no less restrictive than those rules that apply to charter conversions by other financial institutions.” The FDIC, the OTS and the Comptroller of the Currency do not direct how their regulated entities are to obtain shareholder approval for a charter conversion. In fact, for all other types of financial institutions, it is the successor agency that regulates conversion, thereby removing regulatory conflicts of interest.